Getting the TPP Done Right More Important than Getting it Done Right Away

TTP Ship Sailing

With the 19th round of negotiations toward completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement underway in Brunei, time is rapidly running out to finalize a deal before the member countries’ self-imposed deadline of the end of this year. But with the recent entry of the world’s third largest market, Japan, into the TPP and key sticking points like intellectual property (IP) protections and enforcement provisions remaining to be negotiated, one is forced to ask: What’s the rush?

It shouldn’t be all that surprising that the TPP has not progressed as fast as many would have hoped this year. We had an acting U.S. Trade Representative for several months before Michael Froman was confirmed by the Senate. And a 12-nation agreement that comprises approximately 40 percent of global trade was always going to be an ambitious lift, with each country having its own priorities. But as negotiators scramble to finish an historic free trade agreement that has been years in the making and could reshape global trade rules, perhaps they should take a step back and revisit the reason behind that deadline. At this late stage, it will be extremely difficult for U.S. negotiators to wrap up the TPP by year end without making untenable concessions on certain key issues such as ensuring the highest intellectual property rights (IPR) standards and protections in the agreement. That would be a grave mistake.

That’s because, in addition to the economic benefits the United States stands to reap from the TPP, the agreement also has the potential to serve as a model trade agreement that sets new global standards for international commerce, redefining the way we think about trade agreements. With the IPR chapters—arguably the most complex in the entire TPP—yet to be completed, now is the time for U.S. negotiators to insist that the TPP install robust IPR protections on issues ranging from 12 years of data exclusivity for biologics to protecting digital content from Internet piracy. As ITIF writes in Ensuring the Trans-Pacific Partnership Becomes a Gold-Standard Trade Agreement, if the TPP wants to represent a pact of nations in which innovation flourishes to the fullest possible extent, then it’s incumbent on all nations participating in the agreement to craft the highest levels of IPR protection possible. Certainly that should be given priority over finishing up the TPP in haste.

And about that arbitrary deadline: it’s good to set lofty goals that make participants in the TPP work harder to craft a robust agreement, and member countries should be applauded for their yeoman efforts to date. But the TPP, given its magnitude, is far too important to rush through. Let’s also not forget that 5 of our would-be 11 TPP partners—Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam—remain on USTR’s Special 301 Watch List (with Chile on the Priority Watch List) as countries that are not currently living up to their obligations to protect the interests of foreign intellectual property rights holders. A goal for our negotiators must be to ensure that these nations start playing by the rules before being rewarded with additional benefits, instead of bowing to pressure and putting the United States at a competitive disadvantage.

By doing so, and by putting particular emphasis on the intellectual property chapters of the TPP, we can ensure that we’re both crafting an agreement that ensures all American industries, from agriculture to information technology, can compete on a level playing field, while at the same time crafting an agreement that will create the conditions by which innovation can flourish in all TPP member nations.

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About the author

Stephen Ezell is a Senior Analyst with the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), with a focus on innovation policy, international information technology competitiveness, trade, and manufacturing and services issues. He is the co-author with Dr. Atkinson of "Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage" (Yale, 2012). Mr. Ezell comes to ITIF from Peer Insight, an innovation research and consulting firm he co-founded in 2003 to study the practice of innovation in service industries. At Peer Insight, Mr. Ezell co-founded the Global Service Innovation Consortium, published multiple research papers on service innovation, and researched national service innovation policies being implemented by governments worldwide.
  • Esther

    If you state that “A goal for our negotiators must be to ensure that these nations start playing by the rules”, may I ask you of which rules you are thinking? US rules or international trade and IP rules? We should not ignore that these are sovereign countries only bound by their international obligations and their national legislation and not by US law. The perspective in this article is biased: one cannot simply ignore that the USTR’s Special 301 Watch List is highly controversial and that many scholars, including (even) US scholars, sincerely doubt whether the Watch List offers a constructive approach towards international trade and IP norms.

  • Michelle Wein

    Certainly no one is arguing that these nations need to implement U.S. policies – they are free to do as they please with their own governments. However, if they wish to be a part of the TPP (and certainly they must, because they have been involved in negotiations), then they must agree to play by international rules which include, according to the WTO, acceding to the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Canada only implemented the Berne Convention this year and Mexico has yet to do so. The point of the TPP is to broadly liberalize trade within the Asia-Pacific region, in order to spur economic development and growth. But in order to do so effectively, a set of high standard rules regarding the manner in which countries engage with each other in the global trade arena needs to be negotiated and upheld. The best way of doing so is choosing policies that are proven successes. Some are just strengthening the rules already in place under the WTO, but some include specific policies from the United States, Japan, or other efficacious high growth economies around the world. If the countries involved have a problem with this, then no one is forcing them to be a part of this trade agreement. But getting left behind seems like a pretty effective incentive.